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Executive Summary

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has enjoyed a long and successful orthopedic assistance program in Mozambique. The program, which was
developed in response to a humanitarian
emergency, initially provided essential services for thousands of Mozambicans disabled
by the war and its lingering after effectslandmines. In 1994, with peace at hand
and the country’s first democratic elections
successfully completed, the program shifted
its approach and began to focus on increasing
the quality and quantity of services in an effort to develop sustainable practices and
methods.
In 1998, as a result of the establishment of a
new unit within the Ministry of Health
(MISAU), the Section of Physical Medicine
and Rehabilitation (SMFR), and recommendations made in a USAID-sponsored evaluation,
the program’s focus shifted out of direct involvement in the management and administration of rehabilitation services and into providing technical assistance, long-term training
opportunities, and support to indigenous disability advocacy groups. The orthoprosthetic
rehabilitation centers became the direct responsibility of the provincial and district hospitals in which they were located, and oversight
was to be provided by the SMFR.
Since the reorganization of the program in
1998, the quality and quantity of prosthetic
and orthotic services has rapidly declined.

vii

Production in the four main orthopedic centers has dropped by more than 51 percent. In
the year 2000, only 309 prostheses were produced in the country, despite a conservative
production capacity of more than 1,000 devices per year. The quality of fittings and
workmanship has taken an equally startling
turn for the worse.
Orthopedic services are the responsibility of
the Ministry of Health, but they are given
lower priority within the ministry compared
to other important preventative and curative
health issues. As a result, little interest is paid
to these programs, and diminutive resources
are allocated for them.
The challenges facing the rehabilitation sector in Mozambique are not unique. Although
the MISAU must continue to play a crucial
role in this health issue and service, orthoprosthetics will never be cost-effective
enough for the government to absorb within
its current health budget and manage within
its existing structure. A number of alternative
management, administrative, and financial
structures have been attempted in other African countries. Several of the more successful
options are based on public-private sector
partnerships and oversight boards outside of
the day-to-day management structure. It is
incumbent upon the MISAU to further explore, and in a controlled pilot program, examine the potential benefits these models
provide.

Introduction

Through the Leahy War Victims Fund
(LWVF), the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) mission in Mozambique
has been supporting orthopedic assistance since
1989. At that time, civil war continued to rage
and civilian casualties from armed attack as
well as from landmine accidents continued to
mount. In response to the need for prosthetic
and orthotic services, USAID began providing
support to the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) and later to Handicap International (HI) to assist the Ministry of Health
(MISAU) in developing and operating prosthetic and orthotic workshops in five provinces.
Over time, the program’s purpose expanded to
include increasing the capacity of nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and MISAU to
provide mobility as well as social and economic
integration services for people with disabilities.
Since 1995, Prosthetic and Orthotic Worldwide
Education and Relief (POWER) has managed
all orthopedic assistance funnelled through
USAID. To date, USAID/Mozambique has invested more than $10 million in the rehabilitation sector.
POWER’s involvement in the orthopedic sector under its USAID assistance program initially focused on providing direct management and administrative and technical support
to the provincial rehabilitation centers. Under
this initial cooperative agreement, the quality
and quantity of devices produced and services
delivered increased substantially. In 1998, a
new cooperative agreement was negotiated.
Under this agreement, all technical and mana1

gerial oversight and responsibility was subsumed under the MISAU. POWER’s role became advisory, with a small amount of
financial assistance going toward the production of orthopedic componentry. Both the demand and delivery of services has declined
steadily since the technical responsibility for
providing orthopedic services was transferred
to the MISAU. Client satisfaction is low and
staff morale and motivation is waning.
As a result of the declining demand and poor
quality of devices delivered, USAID, the
LWVF, and POWER determined to conduct
an external program evaluation. The evaluation was divided into two parts: (1) an orthoprosthetic technical review and (2) a feasibility study on the possibility of having a
charitable not-for-profit organization manage
prosthetic and orthetic services. This report
represents the orthopedic technical review.
Country Background
Mozambique has a population of approximately 18 million (1996 statistics) and covers
799,380 square kilometres. It is one of the
poorest countries in world. The gross domestic product (GDP) was estimated at $80 in
1989 and only $133 in 1995 (MRCS 2000).
After gaining its independence from Portugal
in 1975, Mozambique became embroiled in
civil war. With the signature of the “Accords
de Rome” in 1992, however, that conflict
between the Marxist regimes of Maputo,
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the Frente de Liberta Vão de Mozambique
(FRELIMO), and the anti-Communist armed
resistance of the Resistencia National Mocambicana (RENAMO) ended. The country has enjoyed relative peace since that time. Although it
has been dominated by President Chissano’s
party, FRELIMO, since 1994, Mozambique has
been governed as a multiparty democracy.

Mozambique demonstrates a strengthening market economy and good economic
growth despite its remaining problems and
difficulties. Agriculture production, foreign
investment, tourism, access to education
and health services, and civic participation
in local and national affairs are all on the
rise.
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Overview of Prosthetics and Orthotics Services

Development of Prosthetics
and Orthotics Services
During the period when Mozambique was
ruled by Portugal, the country had only one
private limb-fitting workshop. This workshop,
located in the capitol, Maputo, was abandoned after Mozambique gained its independence in 1975. International organizations, in
collaboration and partnership with the
MISAU, reinitiated prosthetics and orthotics
services in the early 1980s as a direct result of
the need generated from the civil war.
During the last 20 years, an estimated $25
million has been provided for physical rehabilitation assistance programs in Mozambique. Major contributors include USAID
(through the LWVF this contribution is more
than $10 million), the European Union (EU),
and other agencies. During this period, about
14,800 orthopedic appliances were delivered
(prostheses and orthoses) through the nine

orthopedic centers established and supported
by ICRC, HI, and POWER. Following is a
brief description of the various programs and
projects.
The International Committee of the Red
Cross Program (1981–1995)

In 1981, the International Committee of the
Red Cross, in collaboration with the Ministry
of Health (MISAU), began offering prosthetics and orthotics services at the central hospital in Maputo. The program operated for 14
years. During this time, the ICRC developed
the process for manufacturing orthopedic appliances, local production of orthopedic components, and patient gait training. Activities
included on-the-job training for national staff
in the different sections. Early in the program,
an 18-month training program was established
for prosthetics and orthotics technician’s
assistants.

Statistics under the ICRC Assistance Program (1981-1995)
Maputo
(1981–1995)

Beira
(1986–1995)

Prostheses delivered

4,711

1,728

New prostheses patients

2,496

Orthoses delivered
New orthoses patients
Pairs of crutches

Nampula
(1989–1995)

Total

939

815

8,193

774

648

406

4,324

not reported

287

61

not reported

348

not reported

219

45

not reported

264

not reported

not reported

not reported

25,964

25,964
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Quelimane
(1986–1995)
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Using staff trained under this program, ICRC
then extended P/O services to the provinces of
Beira, Quelimane, and Nampula. Before phasing out its program in 1995, the ICRC provided a formal three-year training program in
orthopedic technology for 24 national orthopedic technicians.

II level). In 1996–1998, HI also implemented
training for physiotherapy technicians (assistant level) in Pemba. The French Cupertino
and the British High Commission financed
this project. Between 1995 and 1996, HI
provided technical assistance in the
MISAU’s various other projects, i.e., providing equipment for and installing physiotherapy sections in 16 provincial hospitals. This
effort was funded by the European Economic
Community (EEC) and from the Canadian
cooperation and also included assistance for
patients transit centers and a communitybased rehabilitation (CBR) program, and
support to the center for the rehabilitation of
Malhangalene children in Maputo.

Handicap International (1986–2000)

Handicap International, in collaboration with
the Ministry of Health, set up two small orthopedic workshops in Vilanculos and Inhambane in 1986 and 1987, respectively. In
1990 and 1991, HI set up two more orthopedic workshops in Nampula (North), which
produced only orthoses, and Tete (Northwest). Two additional workshops were established in Pemba (far North) in 1993 and in
Lichinga (far Northwest) in 1996. All six
workshops were attached to district and provincial hospitals. As part of the MISAU system, the centers experienced administrative
problems and HI had difficulty in raising adequate and consistent funding.

In 1993–1994, HI handed over the responsibility for overseeing its six orthopedic workshops to the MISAU. However, HI’s financial assistance to the MISAU continued. HI
also provided support for two technical advisers who were posted at the MISAU office
in Maputo. At HI’s initiative, MISAU created a department within the ministry to establish policy for, supervise, and manage the
physical rehabilitation programs at the national and provincial levels. In 1997, an
agreement was signed and the SMFR (Section of Physical Medical and Rehabilitation)
was officially created. Three HI technical
advisers were posted full time at the SMFRMINSAU office until May 2000. Under the
HI structured plan, the SMFR became

In 1991, HI received U.S. Agency for International Development/Leahy War Victims
Fund financing to implement a one-year
training course for orthopedic technicians
(note: during the team’s visit some of these
technicians were wrongly said to have
achieved an internationally recognized Category

Statistic Records under HI’s Assistance (1986-2000)
Vilanculos
(1986–
2000)

Inhambane
(1987–
2000)

Nampula
(1990–
2000)

Tete
(1991–
2000)

Pemba
(1993–
2000)

Lichinga
(1996–
2000)

Total

Prostheses
delivered

579

767

0

256

140

14 (*)

1,756

Orthoses
delivered

514

316

66 (*)

252

281

5 (*)

1,434

Crutches
delivered

2,827

5,541

1,391 (*)

3,443

3,065

250 (*)

9,671

* Some figures for Nampula and Lichinga are either not reported or missing.

4

Orthoprosthetic Technical Assessment of POWER’s Programs

responsible for coordinating, overseeing, and
establishing policy for orthoprosthetics and
rehabilitation activities. However, the SMFR
lacked the budget, authority, and credibility to
play such a crucial role. These failings persist
today.

Doorten, as the advisory monitoring and
evaluation officer. Mr. Doorten was retained
full time and based at the SMFR-MISAU office. In addition, POWER’s obligations under
the agreement include
•

POWER Cooperative
Agreement I: 1995–1998

•

In October 1995, shortly after ICRC phased
out its program, POWER and the MISAU
signed a three-year technical assistance agreement. The Leahy War Victims Fund and the
local USAID mission provided $1,824,276 in
financing. During this agreement, POWER
oversaw the activities of the four former ICRC
orthopedic projects (Maputo, Beira, Nampula,
and Quelimane). POWER was directly involved in managing these orthopedic centers,
i.e., controlling the quality of prosthetics and
orthotics, producing components, managing
logistics, providing materials, managing patient’s services, and arranging for training and
education for P/O staff. POWER also supervised the ordering and purchasing of imported
equipment and materials.
POWER Cooperative
Agreement II: 1998–ongoing

As a result of the establishment of the SMFR
as well as the recommendations from a
USAID-funded assessment team, a new
agreement between POWER and the MISAU
was signed in November 1998. The Leahy
War Victims Fund provides total funding in
the amount of $2,181,024 for this agreement.
Under this agreement, the MISAU has full
responsibility for managing the four main orthopedic centers. POWER’s role under this
agreement is advisory (initially done jointly
with HI) and is based at the SMFR-MISAU
office. Moreover, under the agreement
POWER became involved in providing oversight visits to all nine orthopedic workshops.
In January 1999, POWER recruited a certified
prosthetist/orthotist (CPO), Mr. Ronald
5

•
•

•
•

Funding the acquisition of necessary materials for the fabrication of orthopedic
appliances,
Managing and administering funds and
the use of materials in all limb-fitting
workshops of the MISAU,
Managing and collecting statistics for a
database of patients,
Conducting regular technical evaluations
with the MISAU and national investigations of the disabled,
Financing training of technical staff, and
Producing regular activities reports.

The CPO left Mozambique in 2000 prior to
end of his contract because of frustrations
with his job and an inability to work productively within a governmental bureaucracy.
Mr. Doorten’s detailed report of findings and
recommendations is essential reading if one is
trying to understand the difficulties and dissatisfaction he experienced. As a result of his
departure, some of POWER’s obligations under the cooperative agreement have not, and
will not, be met.
The present POWER agreement will be completed at the end of 2001. In collaboration
with USAID and the LWVF, POWER would
like to determine whether the current status
quo will allow for a productive program or
whether the MISAU will be receptive to trying a different service delivery approach. One
option that has been presented to the government is the creation of a charitable not-forprofit NGO that can manage P/O services outside of the direct control of the MISAU.
The Jaipur Limb Campaign Project/
Mozambican Red Cross Society

In 1998, the Jaipur Limb Campaign Project
(JLP) (based in London, UK) and the
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Mozambican Red Cross Society (MRCS) set
up a not-for-profit service project for amputees in Manjacaze, Xai Xai province. This
project began in March 2000. Due to the lack
of qualified orthopedic technologists and the
poor skills of resident staff, services have
been limited to below knee prostheses.

from congenital causes or disease. Few amputations are as a result of motor vehicle or industrial accidents.

The newly constructed center has hostel-type
accommodations with 18 beds and laundry
and kitchen services. It is a pleasant environment for both staff and clients. Despite the
free services and the nice accommodations
offered the center has rarely had more than
three patients at any one time since it opened.

Ten orthopedic workshops are located in nine
provinces (out of the 10 provinces in the
country) in Mozambique. Two orthopedic
workshops are located in the province of Inhambane (north of Maputo). Manica province
(west central Mozambique) is the only province without a P/O workshop.

To date, the center has registered 170 and delivered 76 prostheses. Follow-up visits to amputees are also part of the services the center
provides. Eighteen patients have been visited.
The majority of the patients visited live fairly
close to the center. Follow-up visits to patients in remote areas are extremely time consuming. The JLC-MRCS orthopedic center
is not included in the MISAU’s national
program.

During this evaluation, the team could not
visit all of the centers. However, the team visited the centers in Maputo, Beira, Quelimane,
Inhambane, and Manjacaze. The condition in
these centers were found to be representative
of those in all of the centers. The team had
access to detailed information about the other
orthopaedic workshops in follow-up reports
and statistics from the MISAU and POWER.

Current and Potential Capacity of
Prosthetics and Orthotics Services

The country has a sufficient number of orthopedic facilities for the present. Additionally,
as noted earlier in this report, over the past 20
years international humanitarian organizations
have been committed to assisting in the delivery of services for people with disabilities.

Number of Amputees and
Causes of Disability
According to various governmental and nongovernmental surveys, Mozambique has approximately 9,000 amputees. Including other
types of physical disability, the total number
of persons with disabilities affected is in the
range of 25,000.
POWER-SMFR statistics from 1997 to 2000
show an average of 950 new patients per
year in need of orthopedic appliances. The
number of patients is approximately 10 percent higher than the present total capacity
output.

Under the POWER/MISAU partnership from
1995–1998, the number of prostheses delivered in the four main orthopedic centers averaged nearly 700 limbs per year. This capacity
was sustained during the period although near
the end it dipped slightly. During this time,
orthotic production increased significantly
and constantly, from less than 200 appliances
delivered per year to an average of 439 per
year. Orthotic production peaked in 1998 with
634 orthoses delivered.

In 2001, amputations from landmines represented about 11 percent of all new patients
attending the orthopedic centers. This number
is sharply down from 29 percent in 1997.
Other major amputations reported are either

The output from the other five orthopedic
workshops (formerly under HI) during that
same time frame averaged only 145 prostheses per year. In 1998, it reached a peak of 167
limbs per year.
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Statistics in 1999 show a quick decline in
production, which corresponds and is directly
related to the point at which HI transferred the
responsibility of the workshops to the
MISAU. In 2000, only 142 prostheses were
delivered from the five HI-assisted workshops. The decline was most dramatic in the
four POWER-assisted orthopedic centers. In
these centers, production dropped by 51.2
percent. By the end of 2000, only 309 prostheses were delivered.
Combined output figures from 1994–1998,
including both prostheses and orthoses from
all nine orthopedic centers, show a constant

Number
1

Categories

increase in P/O outputs when POWER was
directly involved in the orthopedic activities.
This followed a projected 10 percent increase
under the POWER/MISAU agreement. However, during the last period 1999–2000, the
total capacity for P/O services dropped by an
average of 23.3 percent (see general statistics
in Appendix E).
Existing Human Resources in P/O
A total of 106 people work in the nine orthopedic centers managed by the SMFR-MISAU.
The following chart outlines the numbers of,
classification for, and salaries of these people.

Training

Salary Range
(monthly)

Head of O/P SMFR-MISAU

O/P technology, Bachelor of Science
(BSc)

more than: $165

21 (*)

Orthopedic technologists
Cat. 2 / ISPO

three-year diploma O/P technology,
ICRC-ISPO

minimum: $95
maximum: $165 USD

30

Orthopedic technicians
Cat. 3 / ISPO

less than two-year certificate on-the-job
training ICRC-POWER

minimum: $75
maximum: $112

34

Bench workers
(Category 3)

leather, metal, wood, plastic on-the-job
training

minimum: $47
maximum: $75

18

Assistants

helpers and cleaners

within the lowest range

Administrators

office work

within the medium range

2

(*) Presently, five orthopedic technologists are not producing devices. Three are attending a three-year (BSc), Cat.1. course in
France and will return in July 2001. Two are attending a four-year (Master of Science [MSc]) degree program for orthopedic
engineers in Scotland. They will return in 2003.

The developing country norms in P/O services suggest that qualified orthopedic technologists (Category II) assisted by orthopedic
technicians (Category III) should have the
capacity to deliver at least six prostheses and
six orthoses per month. Therefore, the potential capacity for Mozambique should be about
1,056 prostheses and 1,056 orthoses a year
(including one month annual leave for staff
and work handled by the five absent technicians). Time needed to repair orthopedic appliances is not considered in this
calculation because orthopedic technicians

7

(Category III) and bench workers can perform these duties without lowering the overall production numbers. During the last
two years, production figures from all nine
centers were 2.5 times (150 percent) lower
than Mozambique’s potential production
capacity.
Mozambique has 122 physiotherapists and
physiotherapy assistants operating out of the
district and provincial hospitals and distributed in the nine orthopedic centers and 39
hospitals in the country.
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Causes and Problems of Low
Capacity in Prosthetics and
Orthotics Activities

2. Deficiencies in the Development of P/O
Services
The team’s discussions with national- and
provincial-level players (MISAU, DNSA,
DAM, SMFR, and MMCAS) in Maputo,
Inhambane, Beira, and Quelimane confirmed that P/O services need to be improved. However, such improvements can
not and will not be accomplished without
additional financial and technical support.
The SMFR-MISAU believes that they
cannot change the current situation without more external funding. However, the
team found that existing problems are systemic and do not necessarily require additional financial resources.

Many factors have contributed to the decline
in overall production quantity and quality:
•

•
•

Five orthopedic technologists left to attend upgrading courses in 1998 and 1999
and three other quit
POWER management support was phased
out in 1998
Floods in 1999 and 2000 affected the supplies of materials and patients access to
P/O services

However, these factors do not explain all the
deficiencies of the current situation. Other
significant factors include the following:

3. Other Problems
•
Lack of patients due to transportation problems. Transportation, under
the responsibility and coordination
of the Ministry of Women and Coordination of Social Action has been
unreliable and not well coordinated.
Even when POWER negotiated
agreements and payments directly to
MMCAS, transportation was not being provided.
•
Lack of staff motivation. Some centers
experienced high absenteeism and in
almost all centers staff members
rushed off to second and third jobs as
soon as the day was complete (or even
before). Staff salaries are low and contribute to low productivity. The working environment at the centers is poor
and in some cases dangerous. These
factors all contributed to the poor
quality of P/O services.
•
Low production of components.
Machinery has broken down and has
not been repaired. As a result, the centers have not produced enough, feet,
knee joints, and crutches.
•
Lack of human and material resources.
The system does not have a cost recovery mechanism and the budget allocation from MISAU is not sufficient. Current staff members do not

1. Structure and Responsibility of the
MISAU
Understandably, the MISAU’s priority is
preventive and curative medicine programs. It allocates little or no attention or
resources to physical rehabilitation programs. Under current procedures, there is
a constant turnover of upper-level managers and directors at both the hospitals and
the ministry. This change of personnel has
thwarted the introduction and progress of
necessary changes.
The sole full-time employee of the
SMFR-MISAU, the director, is responsible for co-ordinating all P/O activities, but
he has no real authority. SMFR occupies a
small office without adequate staff or
budget. Plans of action and recommendations from oversight visits are often delayed or hindered by the complex bureaucracy of the MISAU, under which the
SMFR operates. Communication is poor
and the system, thus far, has operated inefficiently. Although he is obstructed by
bureaucracy, even in an optimal environment the head of SSMFR has neither the
leadership skills nor the initiative to effectively co-ordinate the national and provincial hospital P/O workshops.
8
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•

•

have the requisite skills to handle the
responsibilities of their positions. Under qualified staff are allowed to treat
patients and provide services they do
not have the skills to provide.
Lack of proper logistics and supplies.
The MISAU central warehouse is understaffed and transportation to the
provinces is lacking. Vehicles purchased for use under the rehabilitation
program are used for other medical
purposes and their use is not coordinated.
Communication between all departments and staff is poor.

Patient Accessibility to Prosthetic
and Orthotic Services
One of the crucial problems with Mozambique’s P/O services is the patients’ lack of
accessibility to those services. Through it’s
provincial branches, the Ministry of Social
Affairs (MMCAS) is the office tasked with
identifying, registering, transporting, and accommodating the disabled from the districts
as well as following up after service delivery.
The MMCAS implements the services
through its provincial departments (DPASPAI and SIRT units).
In Beira and Quelimane, POWER provides
$23,000 per year in financial support to
MMCAS, which is about $2.5 per patient a day
for food and lodging and $25 for transportation. Little is achieved. In Maputo, Quelimane,
Beira, and Inhambane, no vehicles are available to transport patients and alternative methods of transportation have not been identified.
The team met many patients who had been at
the transit center for several weeks but had not
yet visited the orthopedic center, despite the
fact that the center was less than 5km from the
transit center. The car, it was reported, had
been broken for one year. MMCAS had not
reported this problem to POWER.
The transit centers the team visited were far
from full capacity. In many places, the rooms
9

were occupied more by poor and destitute
people than by disabled people. Some rooms
are also rented but there is not a realistic cost
recovery system.
The ministry (MMCAS-DPAS) does not provide a budget for or maintenance of the transit
centers. The centers are therefore forced to
“fundraise” on their own. In Quelimane, for
example, where POWER negotiated an
agreement to reimburse the transportation and
food/lodging costs for people being served at
the rehabilitation center, MMCAS uses the
money to feed and house all the people at the
center, including the poor and elderly. In the
Quelimane transit center, the poor and elderly
far outnumber the people awaiting services at
the orthopedic center. As a result, the disabled
report receiving only two meals a day consisting solely of beans and rice. Conditions at this
transit center are extremely basic. People report staying up to four months. Coordination
between the DPAS-MMCAS and SMFRMISAU for transportation and follow-up visits to disabled people appears difficult. In
general, patients visited in different transit
centers were not satisfied.
Staff Performance, Motivation,
and Oversight
The evaluation team assumed that the P/O
technicians working in the workshops were
technically acquainted with fabrication methodologies and procedures because they have
had many years of experience and most had
attended more than one training event. Yet,
the team found the quality of job performance
was poor in all the places they visited (with
exception of Quelimane, where the quality
was fair). The team noted careless mistakes,
like improperly assembling components, during visits.
In Maputo, the team saw patients whose prostheses had not been fitted properly but who
had been discharged and counted as successful outcomes. The team was told that technician assistants (Category 3, the lowest) are
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permitted to see and treat patients, duties
normally assigned only to orthopedic technologists who are Category 2 and above. The
center supervisor indicated that quality control procedures were in place and implemented. However, the team saw numerous,
poor-quality devices being used by patients
that had been discharged.

Necessary maintenance for machinery and
building is severely lacking. Consequently,
workshop conditions are declining rapidly.
Technology Used and Quality of
Prosthetics and Orthotics Services
In the early 1990s, ICRC introduced the techniques and materials necessary to locally produce polypropylene components. The orthopedic center in Maputo was modified to
include a workshop to produce components.
The Maputo center produces components for
all centers in Mozambique.

The orthopedic workshops the team visited
were not busy. Absenteeism and unmotivated
staff was often noticed. The orthopedic workshop of Inhambane had neither patients nor
prostheses.
Productivity in general was low in the workshops the team visited. In Maputo, six orthopedic technicians who are eligible (and supposed) to retire are permitted to work
“moderately” instead. The MISAU’s staff
salaries, like those of other government departments, are very low (between $US 75 and
$US 165 per month) while salaries in the private sector are double for the same level of
staff. Staff members note that transportation
alone represents a significant expenses (up to
$US 10 per month).

The Maputo center employs seven bench
workers to produce and assemble feet, knee
joints, alignment components, crutches, and
other small parts. Despite being well equipped
and stocked, the center’s present production
capacity is only 40 feet, 10 knee joints, and 15
crutches per month—only enough to meet the
needs of the Maputo central workshop.
The same pattern of negligence and poor conditions the team saw throughout the country
were also evident in this workshop. For instance, the injection machine used to produce
plastic parts for crutches and prostheses has
been out of use for more than three months
because the brass nozzle had not been fixed.
This is a fairly minor repair. Therefore, injected plastic handles for crutches cannot be
produced. Instead of repairing the injection
machine, the workshop reverted to producing
poor-quality metal crutches.

Regardless of the poor the salaries they receive, the technician’s practice of discharging
patients with poorly fitted prostheses—in
some cases so poor as to cause injury—is unjustifiable. Perhaps the larger question relates
to job satisfaction and whether or not the
technicians are truly happy coming to their
workplace every day. Indeed, most of the
technicians the team met are either studying
in a different field or working at night in an
unrelated position.

Unnecessarily, this workshop is heavily
equipped with tools and machinery (e.g., four
different types of lathe machines) from which
it is possible to reproduce very sophisticated
spare parts. In spite of this fact, the feet produced are too stiff (they cannot flex when the
patient is walking) and badly shaped by hand.
Knee joint components are poor: the metal
tube supporting the knee axis is too weak and
the bushings wear out quickly. Furthermore,
the workshop is quite disorganized. Although
staff members are allocated to departments

Although all P/O centers are formally part of
the provincial or district hospital system, hospital directors are not involved in the services.
The directors state that they are not involved
because they have limited time and orthopedics is not a priority. Recommendations
and follow-up reports from POWER and
SMFR monitoring trips, therefore, receive
little or no consideration and, as a result, have
no impact.
10
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and by level, there is either little division of
labor or staff members are used inappropriately and ineffectively. The workshop is
costly to maintain and the quality of workmanship is poor.
HI/France Technology and Its
Acceptance by the MISAU
In the early 1990s, HI/France initiated the use
of polyvalent technology in the workshops in
Inhambane, Lichinga, Tete, Pemba, and
Vilanculos. It was introduced as “appropriate
technology.” The principles of this technology consist of producing orthopedic appliances at the lowest cost using local materials
available and with minimally trained staff.
The professional P/O community has not generally accepted this technology.
Under HI advisement, the SMFR-MISAU officially accepted this standard, adapted it
slightly and designated it “improved appropriate technology.” By professional standards,
this type of limb should only be used as a
temporary device or as basic walking aids.
The team evaluated an example of this technique in Inhambane and Manjacase where the
Jaipur Limb Campaign, in cooperation with the
Mozambique Red Cross, trained workers for
three months in India. The devices produced
were made by combining a mixture of materials (not well matched) such as aluminium,
metal, plastic, wood, and leather with an improvised type of foot. The resulting foot appeared to be poor and often inappropriate.
Moreover, although this technique was touted
as using locally available materials, and thus
appropriate technology, in reality about 70
percent of the materials used to produce these
devices need to be imported from places such
as South Africa, India, China, or Maputo. As a
result the cost of such devices and the time
needed to fabricate them may be about the
same as the cost of and time needed to produce
the more durable polypropylene prosthesis.
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SMFR-MISAU Budget
The MISAU’s budget is 70 percent funded by
foreign sources and represents only 12 percent of the total national budget.
In 2001, the SMFR proposed a budget of
$219,015 to cover the cost of imported materials. This amount represents MISAU’s 30
percent share. The rest of the costs were to be
covered by HI (20 percent) and POWER (50
percent). A close look at the budget plan
showed an additional $81,237 needed for orthopedic and physiotherapy services at the 10
workshops, this amount included running
costs of offices, stationery, small items, staff
trips within the provinces, and communication expenditures. The budget did not include
salaries or expenditures for the orthopedic
workshops, which instead are directly included in the respective provincial/district
hospital budget. Some orthopedic appliances
and crutches are also sold in hospitals for
“special attendance patients” as allowed by
the MISAU. The selling prices of these items
range from $37 to $109 for prostheses, from
$2 to $68 for orthoses, and $3 for a pair of
crutches. The selling prices are not based on a
realistic cost calculation system but are instead viewed as a patient contribution. Based
on collected information, the SMFR-MISAU
national budget for physical rehabilitation (including physiotherapy) can be estimated at
between $480,000 and $500,000 per year.
Materials, Purchases, Supplies,
and Logistics of SMFR/MISAU
Since 1998, when POWER’s roles and responsibilities were changed to advisory, the
project has experienced significant difficulties
in importing and dispatching materials to the
provinces. Customs procedures within the
government of Mozambique are extremely
long and complicated and even within
MISAU several different departments are involved in this process. As a result, consignments of materials often remain in customs
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for several months before they are received at
the national MISAU warehouse.

for supplying materials to the workshops, the
lack of a cost recovery system, poor to satisfactory quality prostheses produced, lack of
proper communication between the different
ministry departments, and no established
standard of quality with regard to the fit of
prostheses and the delivery of services in general. Since the SMFR-MISAU assumed direct
responsibility for P/O services in 1999, the
capacity for delivering prostheses in the nine
orthopedic centers is about 2.5 times (150
percent) lower than the available capacity
(451 prostheses delivered versus a capacity to
deliver 1,056 per year) and the combined output of prostheses and orthoses dropped by 24
percent. Moreover, the following findings and
recommendations are made.

The team visited the national MISAU warehouse where all hospital equipment and supplies are stored and shipped for the entire
country. Incredibly, the warehouse has only
four employees to handle all stocking functions for the health care needs of the entire
country. These employees state that they are
overwhelmed. This appears to be a gross understatement.
For the P/O sector, components for orthopedic
devices are stored in one small area. Although
some stock was visible, several of the provincial centers visited noted that they had been
waiting up to six months for supplies. In one
center, they stated that they had not received
crutches for two years!

1. Quality of P/O Supplies and Services
Patient accessibility to P/O services is
poor, and when services are available,
they have not generally been of acceptable
quality. Although finances and materials
have affected in the quality and quantity
of services, a number of other factors such
as staff motivation, adequate and appropriate management, training and technical
assistance, and selection of technology
have also played a decisive part.

The management of stock at the warehouse
and the coordination with logistics and supplies departments (Directorate for Administration and Management of Ministry of
Health, Logistics of Ministry of Health,
Technical Department of Logistics, and National Center for Supplies of Ministry of
Health) within the MISAU are inefficient.
During the grant agreement, POWER occasionally used the services of an independent
contractor or other NGO to distribute supplies. On more than one occasion, in order
to get supplies moving at all, POWER offered to pay the costs of shipping supplies to
the provinces through an independent contractor. Unfortunately, the SMFR/MISAU
declined and the provincial workshop went
without necessary orthopedic supplies and
materials.

The projects in Manjacaze and Quelimane
are good examples of the effect of such
other factors. The JLC-MRCS project in
Manjacaze (Gaza province) is independent from the MISAU and sufficiently
funded. Facilities are new and expansive.
However, the quality of devices produced
at this site was not any better than those
seen at the other centers. On the other
hand, in the Quelimane orthopedic workshop, part of the MISAU system, the conditions were poor, equipment limited, and
supplies sporadic, but the few prostheses
provided to amputees were of decent quality. This success was in great part due to
the dedication of the staff; the management provided by the workshop manager,
Arlindo Setavane; and the oversight given
by the hospital director, Dr. Elena F. Mula
Chong.

Conclusions and Recommendations
The situation with regard to P/O services in
Mozambique clearly suggests that the MISAU
cannot sustain P/O program activities in such
a way that the services can meet the needs of
the country’s population. Difficulties include
poor staff performance, an inefficient system
12
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2. Local Production of Orthopedic Components in Maputo
Local production of components in Maputo has been fraught with problems. The
system, as it stands now, is neither efficient
nor effective and should be changed. The
fabrication process involves extremely
technical issues and high expenditures.
This process should not be run as simply
ancillary to an orthopedic workshop.
The 20-year-long experience of the ICRC,
as a pioneer in this field, has proven (with
the exception of production of crutches)
that locally produced components are not
the best approach in P/O programs. The
ICRC found that the programs failed because they were not sustainable in quality,
quantity, and in cost as compared to the
more affordable, centrally fabricated imported components available today. As
such, the ICRC has chosen to outsource
all production of components for prosthetics, orthotics, and wheelchairs. ICRC has
found that it is more efficient and effective to concentrate solely on the already
difficult objective of developing P/O
appliances.
The team recommends that the Maputo
center stop fabricating components. Instead, serious consideration should be
given to accessing and using the
ICRC/Coppet components. In order to
best be informed, a cost/benefit analysis
should be made comparing the importation of the ICRC/Coppet components with
in-country production. In assessing incountry production, it should be anticipated that any local production would be
outsourced to a private facility and not
done with the SMFR/MISAU system.
3. POWER’s Proposal for a Not-forProfit NGO Managing P/O Services in
Mozambique
The initiative proposed by POWER for an
independent NGO or institution to manage
P/O services for disabled people enjoys
wide and varied support and should be
13

explored further. The challenge, however,
will be great. In the team debriefing with
the vice-minister of Health, the government of Mozambique expressed optimism
that the minister himself would welcome
such an initiative.
Since POWER has already worked out an
alliance with ADEMO (local association
of the disabled) and created the Council
for Action on Disability (CAD), there are
a number different options that POWER
could explore. Three options were discussed with the vice-minister of Health
and the evaluation team. There are still
many outstanding issues and agreements
to be made before engaging. For example,
there is the issue of how to deal with staff
and donated equipment belonging to the
MISAU centers. How will this be resolved? What if the recommendation was
to sell excess equipment? Could this be
done? Other outstanding matters include
what type of agreement to create with one
(ADEMO) or many local partners and
what method to use to build sustainability
into the programs.
POWER should not have more than two
partners or too many different types of activities associated with this project, at
least until it has made solid roots. If
POWER expands this initiative too
broadly it will implode with management
and administrative problems and will create a structure that is difficult to control.
4. Conditions for Sustainability of Future
Programs (as proposed in the incountry debriefing)
The following four principles determine
the potential sustainability of any project:
1. Patient accessibility to P/O services
How:
•
Refund part or all of the costs of transportation and accommodation for poor
disabled
•
Use available local transportation and
accommodation possibilities (pension
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family, church, shelters, etc.) and do
not try to create these services within
the same P/O activities
Who:
•
Find/Develop an agreement with
NGOs, private sources, or insurances
companies

with manufacturers, suppliers, and international agencies or donors)
•
Establish a database listing information on disabled people and collect
relevant information for donors
•
Follow up and survey patients serviced
Who:
•
The implementing agency

2. Existence of cost recovery and income-generating mechanisms
How:
•
Establish real cost calculations of all
products supplied and/or services
(physiotherapy)
•
Include small profit (10 percent) and
contingencies (9 percent) (to be made
by external financial audit)
•
Making sell prices available for private clients and for outsource donors
or insurances
Who:
•
Provide services free for disabled war
victims and poor disabled, but the
costs for these services must be reimbursed by NGOs or donors or by small
government participation

Three Options for Future
POWER/MISAU Collaboration

Based on ICRC’s work in Ethiopia and elsewhere in Africa the following three options
should be considered with regard to collaboration between POWER and the MISAU:
1. P/O services under an independent
structure
This structure might be an institution or
NGO (CAD). It would have a board, a
chairman, and representatives from different agencies (ADEMO, Private VIP,
MRCS, associations, MISAU, MMCAS,
etc.). The board would appoint a director
and administrator for the orthopedic center.
In the orthopedic center, the person in
charge, the chief, should be a Category 1
prosthetist/orthotist. This person would be
in charge not only of services, but also of
quality assurance/control in all respective
departments. All P/O activities and services should contain a cost-recovery element and an income-generation mechanism based on real cost calculations. The
Ministry of Defence, insurance companies,
NGO, or other donors would reimburse the
real costs to the center for P/O services.

3. Staff performance under qualification
and motivation
How:
•
Improve salaries for qualified and
committed staff
•
Provide advantages for staff transportation, training, or other possibilities
•
Improve working conditions and environment (clean and attractive set up of
facilities)
Who:
•
Implementing agency (POWER) with
NGO and donors support

CAD Æ Board Æ P/O Center: Director/Administrator

2. P/O services remain under the responsibility of the MISAU but with full
autonomy
Under this option, the center has its own
board (chairman and representatives of
MISAU, MMCAS, MRCS, and others).
The orthopedic center has a director and
administrator appointed by the board.

4. Quality of P/O supplies and services
How:
•
Provide choice and satisfaction to all
disabled (poor and other)
•
Do not produce components locally
but purchase the most affordable imported quality products (possible deals
14
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The MISAU will guarantee national
standards and a minimum salary to the
staff and all P/O activities. Services provided must contain cost recovery and income-generation elements sufficient, at
least, to cover salaries and maintenance.
The Ministry of Defence, insurance companies, NGO, or other donors would reimburse the real costs to the center for
P/O services.
MISAU Æ P/O Center Board: Director/Administrator

3. P/O services are entirely under the
commercial private sector

15

This option could be developed in addition
to or in combination with options 1 and 2.
This option should not be excluded as it offers particular advantages, especially for
difficult cases. MISAU is encouraged to
permit and support the private sector’s participation in the delivery of P/O services.
In all cases, small units of P/O services
should remain under the responsibility of
MISAU hospitals for medical purpose.
These P/O units should be attached to
physiotherapy departments and be limited
to delivering small orthopedic appliances,
such as temporary prostheses.
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Appendix A – Vice-Minister of Health’s
Debriefing on the Assessment of the
POWER/Mozambique Program

1. Context of the Visit (Leahy War Victims Fund [LWVF])
a. Began in 1989. It is a program within
USAID that provides a dedicated
source of financial and technical assistance for civilian victims of war.
“Victims” are persons who suffer
from mobility related injuries, including those injured by land-mines and
those who suffer from polio as a result of interrupted immunization campaigns.
b. LWVF supports programs that provide for the improved mobility of
people with disabilities by providing
accessible, appropriate orthoprosthetic services. Focus is on quality,
availability, accessibility, and sustainability. The Fund also supports
rehabilitation-related services such as
orthopedic surgery and physiotherapy
and works to improve the social and
economic integration of people with
disabilities.
c. In the last 12 years, the LWVF has
provided more than $70 million in
more than 16 countries.
2. The LWVF and Rehabilitation in
Mozambique
a. Mozambique was one of the first
countries supported under the LWVF.
The program of assistance began in
16

1989 through support to the ICRC. In
addition to providing support to the
ICRC, the Fund has provided support
to Handicap International (HI), Save
the Children (for the construction of
the transit centers in Maputo and
Beira), and POWER. The total LWVF
investment in the rehabilitation sector
in Mozambique is approximately
$10.2 million.
b. The POWER program in Mozambique
began in 1996. In collaboration with
the ministry, it was decided that
POWER would assist four centers formerly supported by the ICRC.
Namely, Maputo, Beira, Quelimane,
and Nampula.
c. As a result of work done by Handicap
International to centralize services and
recommendations by a USAID team,
the activities were fully handed over
to the Ministry of Health in
1998/1999. Since that time, within its
partnership with the Ministry of
Health, POWER has played only a
cursory advisory role and provided financial assistance for the manufacture
of orthoprosthetic components.
d. The current partnership between
POWER and the Ministry of Health
(and other partners) ends at the end of
the year. With the end of the program
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close at hand, this assessment was devised to (1) evaluate project impact
since 1998; (2) help develop a closeout and sustainability plan; (3) determine what assistance, if any, the
LWVF could/should provide in the future for rehabilitation in Mozambique;
and (4) suggest/recommend possible
options for such an assistance package, if determined appropriate.
3. Assessment Team and Itinerary
a. The team consisted of the following
individuals:
i. Health economist from the U.K.,
looking at feasibility of public/private sector involvement
ii. Joe Ubiedo, CPO and ICRC
Technical Director.
iii. Rob Horvath, LWVF
iv. Donna Carpenter, USAID/Mozambique
v. Max Denu, POWER
vi. Francisco Baptista, Head of SMFR
vii. Representative, with PAI at the
MMCAS
b. The team visited the following sites:
i. Maputo Orthopedic Center and
general hospital
ii. Manjance Orthopedic Center, supported by Mozambique Red Cross
iii. Inhambane Orthopedic Center and
general hospital, formerly supported by Handicap International.
Also visited the MMCAS transit
center.
iv. Beira Orthopedic Center and general hospital (and MMCAS transit
center)
v. Quelimane Orthopedic Center and
general hospital (and MMCAS
transit center)
vi. Also met with Dr. Candido, Dr.
Mengele, and Dr. Tomo (deputy
director of the Dept. of Planning
and Cooperation)
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4. Starting point: Miller/Whitson and the
status of activities in 1997/98
a. Country moved from emergency/humanitarian relief to development
b. Recommendations were that the MOH
assume responsibility for services.
This has been done and the MOH currently pays all recurring cost. Finances
come from within the hospital’s budgets. POWER (donor) pays only the
costs of materials. In a sense, the program has reached a level of financial
sustainability. However, as findings
indicate there is little or no managerial
and/or technical sustainability in most
centers.
c. The centralization of services has led
to a large decline in both quality and
quantity of services.
5. General Findings. Joe provide more
details depending on Vice-Minister’s
wishes.
a. Materials purchased and/or fabricated with outside resources are not
getting to the centers. Sometimes centers wait more than six months from
time of order. In one center, no
crutches were available for almost
two years.
b. With the exception of one center
(Quelimane), the quality of the devices produced was poor to very bad.
The lack of materials had an affect on
the quantity of services. However,
quality issues were more directly related to staff, despite seemingly adequate skill levels and the existence of
supervision.
c. Although supervision and oversight
visits were made, the visits and subsequent reports have had little or no effect on service delivery.
d. Hospitals take little or no interest in the
delivery of quality services. There are
many higher priority issues. Staff problems/issues are not addressed. Maintenance is not done. Existing space is in-
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adequate and often what does exist is
reallocated for departments.
e. Many trained staff members have departed. Those at the centers work halfheartedly.
f. Work and service delivery environment is unappealing and depressing.
g. Production had declined by more than
40 percent.
h. Demand for services has declined, as
much to do with poor service as with
accessibility.
6. Options
a. Components
i. Continue to manufacture in country – quality and quantity produced
are inadequate. Maputo center
should not continue to manufacture and deliver services. They are
unable to do this effectively.
ii. Purchase/import – Coppet or others
iii. Need to conduct a full cost analysis
iv. Comment on Manjacaze (and HI
approach); supposedly “local”
components. In reality, they import as much as any other center.
b. Service Delivery – regardless of delivery mechanism, LWVF can and will

only support quality services that are
delivered in reasonable quantity.
i. Services remain totally integrated
within the hospital and MOH systems. From centers visited, only
Quelimane would be eligible for
LWVF assistance.
ii. Orthopedic center managed by
separate board but still within
MOH perview.
iii. Management contract outsourced
to NGO/association/foundation.
iv. Privatization.
7. Next Steps
a. Decision taken on possible options.
May be more than one option.
b. If new option, bring team back to develop detailed business and implementation plan. Initial visit of one to two
weeks, followed by individual visits.
c. Selection of implementation site and
development of phase-in plan. May
take up to six months.
i. Includes negotiation of roles and
responsibilities with all players, financial commitments, exit plan
should be built in from the beginning, etc.

18
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Appendix B – Assessment of POWER’s Program
and Feasibility Study on Charitable Not-for-Profit
Organization Managing P/O Services

Term of reference for Orthoprosthetic Technical Evaluation
Purpose: Evaluate POWER’s accomplishments under the two cooperative agreements funded by

USAID.

Provide recommendations on how to ensure sustainability of prosthetics services in Mozambique
after the end of USAID assistance in December 2001.

I. Responsibilities
a. The CPO technical expert will work in
coordination with the team
b. The CPO technical expert will collect
the technical information described
below.
c. The CPO technical expert will present
to the team a technical report, which
shall include the final evaluation results and recommendations.
2. Assessment of current situation
a. Production statistics
i. Capacity
ii. Actual
iii. Changes with handback to MOH
iv. Reasons
b. Human resources issues
i. In-country capacity
ii. Motivation, career path, salary
issues
c. Service delivery issues
i. Patient awareness of service availability
19

d.
e.

f.

g.

ii. Patient access: transit centres,
transport
iii. Patient satisfaction
iv. Service quality
v. Costs
Production, appropriate technology,
and technical quality issues
MOH preferences
i. History (ICRC and HI)
ii. Polyvalent technology (proposed
by MOH)
iii. Current technology used (manufacture of components and appliances)
Implications of patient satisfaction
i. Comments on product offered by
MISAU (ADEMO, ADEMIMO,
etc.)
ii. Comments on service the delivery
Implications for sustainability
i. Local production of components
ii. New products to be locally developed
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iii. Local production vs. importation
of products
h. Volume
i. Production capacity and real production
ii. Need for the future
i. Logistics and supplies management
i. Current system in place/ MISAU’s
system
ii. Control of supplies consumption
(central, provincial level)
j. Supervision, monitoring and evaluation
i. Central and Provincial levels
ii. Implementation of Recommendation

i. Workshop to serve production and
repair of medical equipment for
entire hospital system
ii. Turn workshop over to private
sector
iii. Retain within MOH
iv. Orthoprosthetics
Implementing
Agency
v. Foundation
b. Other possible models in Mozambique
and elsewhere
i. Advantages and disadvantages
4. Recommendations
a. The recommendations will cover the
above-mentioned sections and will reflect an independent technical judgment.

3. Proposals for the future
a. Potential models per Miller and
Whitson

20
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Appendix C – Persons Contacted

MMCAS
•
•
•

Handicap International France

Duarte Joaquim, National Director
Arthur Nhantumbo
Cristina Matsinhe, PAI-MMCAS

•
•

Beira (Province)

MISAU
•
•

•
•
•

Dr. Aida Libombo, Vice-Minister of Health
Dr. Candido, Deputy National Director of
Health (DNSA) and Head of Medical Assistance (DAM)
Dr. Menguele, DAM Dept.
Francisco Baptista, Head of SMFR-MISAU
Dr. Jorge Fernando M. Tomo, Deputy National Director, Directorate of Planning
and Co-operation

•

David W. Hess, Deputy Director
Donna Carpenter, Special Projects Coordinator

Mozambican Red Cross Society
•

•

Texeira Fernanda, General Secretary

•

Dr. Langa, head of Orthopaedic Department
Carlos Passe, head of orthopaedic workshop

•
•

•
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Dr. Celia Gonçalves, Director DPS
Dr. Ana Paula, Hospital Director
Atanazio Pitore, Director DPMMCAS
Ricardo Romeu, Head of orthopaedic
workshop

Manjacaze (Province)
Luis Sautiane, Head of orthopaedic center
and staff.
Jeronimo Ntimane, Administrator

Quelimane (Province)
•

•

Farida Gulamo, General Secretary of
ADEMO

Dr. Americo Assane, Hospital Director of
Beira
Antonia S. P. Charre, Director DPMMCAS
Moises Pedro Vilanculos, Head of
orthopaedic centre

Inhambane (Province)

•

ADEMO
•

•

•

Maputo Central Hospital
•

•

•

USAID
•

Nicolas Bordet, Director
Cristina Vera

•

Dr. Helena Fernando Mula Chong, Hospital Director
Joana Simiao, Director DPMMCAS
Aarlindo Setavane, Head of orthopaedic
workshop
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Appendix D – Evaluation Schedule

Date

Time

Action

04/10/01
04/11/01

8:30 pm
8:30 am

Arrival Joe Ubiedo in Maputo
Meeting POWER office with
Max Deneu and Malcolm
Murray
Meeting SMFR office with
Francisco Baptista and Malcolm Murray
Visit of the CRIM (Children
Project in Malanghalene,
Maputo)
Meeting with Texeira Fernanda, MRCS office
Visit of the orthopaedic center
of Maputo Hospital
Meeting with Francisco Baptista
Meeting with Duarte Joaquim
and Cristina Matsinhe, MMCAS
office
Meeting with H.I.
Discussions with Max Deneu
and Malcolm Murray, POWER
office
Lunch with Donna Carpenter
USAID, Max Deneu and Malcolm Murray
Arrival of Rob Horvath in
Maputo, USAID
Day off
Briefing meeting POWER office
with the team
Meeting with Dr Candido and
Dr Menguele, at MISAU office
Meeting with team POWER
office
Departure to Manjacase by
road
Visit of the JLC-MRCS orthopaedic center
Arrival in Maputo
Meeting at orthopaedic center
of Maputo Hospital
Evaluation visit of the orthopaedic center, Maputo Hospital
continued

10:00
am
11:00
am
2:30 pm
04/12/01

8:00 am
10:00
am
1:00 pm

04/13/01

4:00 pm
8:00 am
12:00
am

04/14/01
04/15/01
04/16/01

8:00 am

04/16/01

11:30
am
2:00 pm

04/17/01

6:00 am

04/18/01

10:30
am
7:30 pm
8:30 am
1:00 pm

Date

04/19/01

04/20/01

Time

Action

2:00 pm

Continuation of meeting with
Carlos Passa, Head of orthopaedic center
POWER office
Meeting with David W. Hess
and Donna Carpenter, USAID
office
Meeting with Francisco Baptista at SMFR office
POWER office
Flight to Inhambane
Meeting with Celia Gonçalves,
DPS, and visit of the orthopaedic workshop and physiotherapy at hospital of Inhambane
Meeting with Director at office
of DPMMCAS and visit of transit center of Inhambane
Arrival in Maputo
Day off
Departure to Beira by air
arrival to Beira
Visit of the orthopaedic center
and physiotherapy at Beira
hospital
Meeting with Antonia Charre,
DPMMCAS, office
Visit of transit center in Beira
Meeting with Dr Americo
Assan, Director of Beira
Hospital
Departure to Quelimane
Visit of the orthopaedic workshop in Quelimane
Meeting with Helena F. Mula
Chong, Director of Quelimane
Hospital
Visit of the transit center in
Quelimane
Meeting with Johana Simao,
Director of DPS in Quelimane
Meeting at orthopaedic workshop
continued

4:00 pm
8:00 am
12:30
pm
4:30 pm
8:00 am
9:30 am

2:00 pm

04/21/01
04/22/01
04/23/01

6:00 pm
2:00 pm
5:00 pm
7:30 am
2:00 pm
2:30 pm
4:00 pm

04/24/01

7:00 am
9:30 am
11:00
am
2:30 pm
4:00 pm
4:30 pm
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Date

Time

04/25/01

10:30
pm
9:00 am
10:00
am
11:00
am
2:00 pm
3:00 pm

04/26/01

11:30
am
3:00 pm

Action
Arrival in Maputo
Meeting with Donna Carpenter, USAID office
Visit of the national warehouse
of the MISAU
Visit of the transit center in
Maputo
Meeting with Dr. Langa,
Maputo hospital
Meeting with Dr Jorge Fernando, Deputy Director of
Cupertino and Plan of MISAU
Meeting with Dr Menguele,
MISAU office
Meeting with Dr Aida Libombo,
Vice Minister of MISAU
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